Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States\u27 International Human Rights Double Standard - Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change by Harfeld, Amy C.
City University of New York Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1
Fall 2001
Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States'
International Human Rights Double Standard -
Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change
Amy C. Harfeld
CUNY School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact
cunylr@law.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' International Human Rights Double Standard - Explanation, Example,
and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y. City L. Rev. 59 (2001).
Available at: 10.31641/clr040104
Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' International Human
Rights Double Standard - Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Penelope Andrews for providing me with the opportunity to let this article
come to life; Professor Rhonda Copelon, who allowed me my first view into the United Nations; Professors
Ruthann Robson, Maivan Lam, Debbie Zalesne and Sharon Horn for their scholarly insight and
encouragement; Professor Victor Goode, for being a wonderful mentor; Colman McCarthy, my teacher,
friend, and guide through revolutions small and large for over a decade; and my parents, Doris B. Harfeld and
Judge David I. Harfeld, for their love and faith irrespective of my choice to do well or good. A special thanks
goes to Natalva Paul, former Editor-in-Chief of the N.Y.C. Law Review, for recruiting this article, and to all of
the CUNY students who staff the N.Y.C. Law Review for their dedication to scholarship and for their hard
work in allowing student voices to emerge and shine.
This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/5
OH RIGHTEOUS DELINQUENT ONE:
THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL




"...[O]nce freed from the conceit that others have no choice
but to follow our example, how do we, in fact, persuade them on
the merits of what we may have to offer?
[The] answer lies in our own rededication to the ideals that we
would have others follow -for in the end, if our actions belie
our ideals, there is no reason to expect others to take them
more seriously than we do."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Righteous indignation should be reserved for the truly right-
eous. Relative to its size and power, the United States is presently
one of the most insolent delinquents in the international human
rights community. Despite this, we** continue to preach to and
* J.D., 2001, City University of New York School of Law; B.A., 1994, University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Professor Penelope Andrews for providing me with
the opportunity to let this article come to life; Professor Rhonda Copelon, who al-
lowed me m' first view into the United Nations; Professors Ruthann Robson, Maivan
LAm, Debbie Zalesne and Sharon Horn for their scholarly insight and encourage-
ment; Professor Victor Goode, for being a wonderful mentor; Colman McCarthy, my
teacher, friend, and guide through revoltitions small and large for over a decade; and
m' parents, Doris B. Harfeld and Judge David I. Harfeld, for their love and faith
irrespective of my choice to do well or good. A special thanks goes to Natalva Paul,
former Editor-in-Chief of the N.Y.C. Law Review, for recruiting this article, and to all
of the CUNY students who staff the N.Y.C. Law Review for their dedication to scholar-
ship and for their hard work in allowing student voices to emerge and shine.
I William P. Alford, Spreading Values by Example: Instead of Assuming China Should be
Like America, the U.S. Must Rededicate ltsel to its Own Ideals, L.A. Times, June 2, 1999, at
B7. Our criticisms of China, for their imperfect human rights record, are a prime
example of the harm caused by our double standard. We are in no position to com-
ment on the civil liberties denied by other regimes when our record regarding differ-
ent rights is equally blemished.
** Please note my choice to tse the collective terms "we" and "ours" in the text of
this article. I have done so for two reasons. The first is personal. I believe that it is
necessary in every individual's journey through politics to take personal responsibility
for one's actions and own up to the problems and issues of one's own country, state,
or community. The idea for this article was born after I spent several years living
abroad and investigating human rights issues in my host country. I made the decision
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chastise other nations around the world for their human rights
shortcomings. If we aim to sustain our credibility and to en-
courage a greater respect for and compliance with international
human rights standards around the world, we must begin to prac-
tice as we preach. 2 We may begin to do so by washing our right-
eous hands of the practice of imposing the death penalty on our
children .'
The U.S. holds itself out to be a pioneer and a continuing role
model of the contemporary idea of rights.4 Indeed, we may legiti-
mately claim to have led an expansion of the international human
rights movement as a long-time member of the United Nations Se-
curity Counsel and other United Nations (hereinafter U.N.) bod-
ies. • At the end of the Second World War, President Franklin D.
that, before 1 continued to criticize those conflicts to which I was a stranger, I had an
obligation to return home and apply the same critical eve to the human rights record
of my own country. Ever, "we" and "our" I write gives me the opportunity to own the
human rights shortcomings of which I speak.
The second reason is to make a point about developing a national collective con-
science about human rights abuses within the United States. By using these collective
terms, I intend to model the sort of example that I believe the United States could set
forth if it were to practice as it preaches in the human rights context.
2 Michael Posner, Foreword: Human Rights and Non-Governmental Organizations on
the Eve of the Next Centur,, 66 FORD. L. REv. 627, 629 (1997) (Posner argues that if "we
encourage the Chinese government to allow prison access to a U.N. working group on
detention," we cannot ourselves deny full access to our prisons by a U.N. investigator).
3 It should be noted from the outset that when I speak of the juvenile death pen-
alty, I am referring to the practice of imposing a sentence of death on a person who
was under the age of 18 at the time the crime was committed. In reality, because of a
drawn-out appeals process and backlogged courts, these children are isually no
longerjuveniles, but in their late twenties and even thirties by the time they are put to
death. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the petitioner is now a middle-
aged man still awaiting his execution. See Stephen B. Bright, Rubin "Hurricane"
Carter, Dorean Marguerite Koenig, William A. Schabas, and W.L. Seriti, Human Rights
and Human Wrongs:Is the United States Death Penalty System Inconsistent with International
Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. RjV. 2813 (1999).
4 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RJGHTS 65 (1990).
5 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to
CEDAW:'- Should the Constitution be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 727, 730 (1996) (exploring the reasons behind U.S. resistance to human rights
treaty ratification, particularly of the Convention on the Elimination of All Formis of
Discrimination Against Women, in the context of constitutionalist and ethnocentric
justifications); see also M. Cherif BassioUni, Reflections on the Ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL. L. Riv,.
1169 (1993) ("[s]ince the inception of the United Nations, the United States has
been a world leader in the development of human rights norns. Its influence in this
field has been unparalleled by any other country"); see also Henkin, infira note 15, at
415 (Americans were prominent among the architects and builders of international
htman rights, and American Constitutionalism was a principal inspiration and model
for them). See generally HAROLD BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED CONSTITU-
TION ABROAD (1986); and CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
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Roosevelt emphatically proclaimed that "the dawn of a new era of
human rights had begun.""' He was so enthused by the notion of
helping to build the foundation and set the tone of this growing
field, that he encouraged the adoption of a "Second Bill of
Rights."7 In the U.S., First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt was also instru-
mental in the formation of the United Nations and in the drafting
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' which has become
a "cornerstone of the international human rights movement"9 and
which she referred to as "a Magna Carta for all mankind.""' Since
that time, our domestic laws have generally proven adequate to
protect and provide most of the human rights that have emerged
as the international standard." We have, albeit selectively, used
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 383-403 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds., 1990).
6 Mayer, supra note 5, at 745. President Roosevelt viewed the Bill of Rights as
deficient and during his State of the Union message in 1944 proposed an amendment
to the Constitution that would address larger social and economic ights. Id. n.85, 90-
I Cong. Rec. 55, 57 (1944).
7 Man' Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-CenturT Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REiv.
516, 528 (1992). The ambitious agenda of this Second Bill of Rights would have
included:
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or
farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation;
The right of ever' family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and
enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
(Citing from Cass R. Sumstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv.
421, 423 (1987)).
8 G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
9 Posner, supra note 2, at 627.
10 Id.
I I Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard. Incorporating
International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law-A Case Study of
Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 71, 77 (2000). The United States
provides quite an extensive array of rights ustially classified as political and civil rights,
or individual liberties, such as rights to free speech and demonstration, bearing of
arms, and religiots freedom. The areas we fall short in are those referred to as social
and economic rights. These include the rights mentioned above by Roosevelt in his
Second Bill of rights, and include the right to affordable health care, housing, food,
clothing and education. See An-Na'im, infra note 47, at 992. The United States has
been mindful of this gap as we have leveled criticism at other countries' human rights
shortcomings. We generally limit our criticisms to the denial of rights that are well
protected in the United States, thus trumpeting our own horn while sitting in judg-
ment. Yet we remain silent about deprivations of economic and social rights in other
countries, as pointing them out would call attention to our own weak spots.
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our economic power and political influence to call attention to for-
eign human rights iolations by placing embargoes and refusing
aid to nations that persistently trample on human rights.' 2
While quick to condemn human rights violations abroad, the
U.S. cannot brag about its own human rights record. Currently, we
stand as the only major world power who has failed to fully ratify or
adhere to any of the significant human rights instruments intro-
duced by the U.N. or other human rights bodies.'3 Worse, the U.S.
has imposed and defended a host of domestic practices that di-
rectly contravene these treatises.' 4 Some attribute this contradic-
tion to the illusion that the U.S. Constitution is the supreme
instrument of rights and liberties. 15 A deeper inspection, however,
exposes us as "the country in which the highest court of the land
permits the execution of possibly innocent people, and individuals
with mental retardation, allows police to search vehicles on a
neighbor's word of suspicion, upholds the kidnapping of foreign-
ers for trial... and pardons police brutality in the name of 'good
faith.""" Such conduct hardly befits a nation that appoints itself as
a human rights model to be emulated. While the U.S. wields enor-
12 See generally Andrew K. Fishman, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The Use ofEconomic
Sanctions and Threats to International Peace and Security, 13 EMORY INT'L L. RL"v. 687
(1999) (the most compelling example of this may be found in the sanctions placed on
Iraq in 1991 following its invasion of Kuwait. These sanctions, imposed in response to
Iraq's affront to democratic values and human rights, have prodtced a host of dis-
turbing human rights violations suffered by the Iraqi people). See Cleveland, infra
n.192, at 37 (the United States imposed sanctions for foreign policy purposes approxi-
matelv sixty-one times between 1993 and 1996, noted in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURES, A CATALOG OF NEw U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANcTIIONS FOR FOR-
EIGN POICY PURPOSES 1993-1996 (1997)).
13 See Henkin, supra note 4, at 66; Glendon, supra note 7, at 526; see generally, Alfred
de Zavas, The Potentialfor the United States Joining the Covenant Family, 20 GA. J. INT'L. &
COMI'. L. 299 (1990).
14 See Harrington, infra note 16.
15 There may be some basis for this notion, though it must be viewed in a larger
and more critical context. See generally Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights, 88 CoiUam. L. REV. 537 (1988) (noting that the Bill of Rights has
directly informed the creation of human rights charters adopted by a number of
newly independent countries, and has served as a standard by which to review judicial,
legislative, and administrative action in those new nations). See also Louis Henkin,
United States Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 341. ("The United States will not undertake any treaty obligation that it
will not be able to carry because it is inconsistent with the United States Constitu-
tion.") See also Lillich, infra note 57, at 60-61 (giving as an example a Supreme Court
of Zimbabwe decision involving the whipping sentence of a male that took into con-
sideration U.S. Supreme Courtjurisprudence such as Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958).
16 James C. Harrington, The Two Sides of Humanity, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at
M6.
[Vol. 4:59
OH RIGHTEOUS DELINQUENT ONE
mous power in influencing other nations to further their protec-
tion of human rights, we have not yet taken the initiative and
courage to turn the lens inward and solve our human rights
contradictions. 1 7
One particularly troubling paradox between what the U.S.
practices and what it preaches in the realm of international human
rights is our continued and increasing use of the death penalty on
child offenders.'" Although we are members of more than one
human rights convention that unequivocally prohibits such a sen-
tence, we have reserved for ourselves a number of loopholes that
enable us to continue the practice unfettered."9 These killings dis-
tinguish us as one of the only U.N. signatories to openly perpetuate
the execution ofjuveniles.21 Our hypocrisy undermines U.S. credi-
bility in the eyes of the international human rights community and
contributes to a general deterioration of the authority of interna-
tional human rights law.2 ' Why should other countries abide by
such treatises if the U.S. can get away with such a flagrant violation?
I chose this issue to explore because it seems to present the
17 See Lester, supra note 15, at 561. ("For the United States, human rights have
been a kind of 'white man's burden,' and international human rights have been 'for
export only'. . .t]here is some reluctance to accept, and have our courts apply, stan-
dards perceived to have been created by others, even if they were borrowed from us
and reflect our own values." (quoting Louis Henkin, The United States and Interna-
tional Human Rights, in Justice for a Generation, Papers presented in London, En-
gland,July 15-19, 1985 at the plenary sessions of a meeting between the American Bar
Association, the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, and the Law Societ' of
England and Wales, at 373-80)). See generally Henkin, supra note 4.
1 I would like to acknowledge from the outset my own position and purpose in
pointing to this example. My aim is to condemn this practice not only as immoral
and inhumane, but particularly as one that has been almost universally condemned
and prohibited, both legally and ethically, around the world. I would also like to
point out here another issue that surfaces in dealing with thejuvenile death penalty-
the arbitrary age of 18 as the age of majority. This determination of a magical age at
which children suddenly mature into adults for purposes of criminal culpability is
imperfect, and often inappropriate. For obvious reasons of uniformit, and objectivity,
however, it is the most widely accepted age of maturity.
19 See infra Section IV.
20 See Bright et al., supra note 3, at 2793 (observations by Stephen Bright).
21 But seeJack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & The United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 365 (1998) ("[p]erhaps the United States' failure to subject
itself to these international processes undermines its moral authority to enforce
human rights. It is not at all clear, however, that the efficacy of international human
rights law depends on moral authority in this way. Compliance with human rights law
depends on the costs of non-compliance. Effective coercive measures are usually car-
ried out by or with the support of the United States. . . [tlhe efficacy of these mea-
sures is not likely to be affected by the extent to which the United States itself engages
the international human rights law process. United States' ability to present (or with-
hold) status in international organizations, is unaffected by [our] practice of execut-
ing juvenile murderers...").
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most widely understood and obvious example of the sort of human
rights delinquency of which I accuse the U.S. My purpose in this
section is not to make an attempt at an exhaustive survey of the
juvenile death penalty-the literature on this subject is already
quite extensive. Rather, I use the issue as a way of "outing" the U.S.
for its human rights double standard and the harm it causes both
domestically and internationally.
It is time for the U.S. to acknowledge and correct this double
standard. This may be accomplished three ways: 1) through the
use of domestic law, legislation, and jurisprudence; 2) by promot-
ing agitation and activism in U.S. civil society and international ac-
tivism and press coverage; and 3) by utilizing the abilities of
international adjudicative bodies' to press for U.S. compliance with
human-rights norms. Ultimately, abandoning our self-righteous at-
titude will further our ability to promote and model rather than
erode human rights in the international community. 22
The United States seems to have benefited from a widespread
presumption that, as one of the most assertive proponent of
human rights on the world scene, it must be in substantial compli-
ance with international human rights law. This view has persisted
in spite of the U.S.'s insistence on upholding domestic standards
that var[y] significantly from the relevant provisions of interna-
tional law. It seems high time for the international community to
reconsider its indulgent attitude vis-A-vis U.S. non-compliance with
international norms generally.2-3
This article explores the failure of the U.S. to keep pace with
the international community in human rights evolution and com-
pliance. Our failure to do so compromises our ability to contribute
to the movement as a model. Throughout this article, I will inter-
weave the already prolific literature on the topics of this article with
my own perspectives and experiences, with the hope of formulat-
ing potential solutions that would ameliorate the U.S.'s history of
human rights delinquency.
II. SETnING THE STAGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The atrocities of the Holocaust moved the international com-
munity to expand the traditional focus of international law from
22 Mayer, supra note 5, at 730 (pointing out a troubling pattern of U.S. legal paro-
chialism in hutman-rights matters and a refusal to consider upgrading U.S. law on
human rights to meet higher, international norms).
23 Id. at 822.
[Vol. 4:59
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concerns such as diplomatic immunity and rules of war, to include
governance of the way a nation treats its citizens. -4 Suffering from
guilt over our complacency to deter such atrocities and quick to
draw attention away from our own civil rights crisis, the U.S.
emerged as a leader in the growing human rights arena. Initially,
the U.S. helped to develop new concepts of universal human
rights, playing a key role in the birth of the U.N. and in the crea-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 5 Drafted to
create interstate obligations, human-rights agreements encouraged
societies to convert the negotiated principles into enforceable laws
in their respective domestic legal systems. Therefore, it is no acci-
dent that the core of rights guaranteed by international human
rights laws and those protected by the U.S. Constitution overlap
considerably.
Our involvement in this burgeoning movement was marred,
however, by the blight of racial segregation and discrimination tak-
ing place domestically.2" Human rights were seen as a direct
threat to the existing order of racial inequality at that time. -7 For
instance, as the Truman Administration and human-rights leaders
24 See Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 365.
25 See generally Mayer, supra note 5.
26 GayJ. McDougall, Symposium: The Jnernational Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Do-
mestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40
How. L. J. 571 ("[r]acism has always been America's Achilles heel in international
relations ... However, from the days of the slave trade to more modern instances of
police brutality... the U.S. has resisted international scrutiny of domestic policies and
practices that evidence racism"); see also Thomas, infra note 30, at 17 (the Civil Rights
Congress filed a petition with the United Nations charging genocide under the Geno-
cide Convention. Although no formal charges against the U.S. resulted, the appeal
succeeded in drawing attention and ire against the U.S. for domestic race-based
human rights violations).
27 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 751; see also Thomas Btiergenthal, The United States
and International Human Rights, 9 Hum. RTS. L.J. 141, 144 (1988). In many ways,
human rights were indeed a threat to that domestic order. See also Thomas, infra note
30, at 18, citing a radio interview with Malcolm X just prior to his death:
([O]ur problem has to be internationalized. Now the African nations
are speaking out and linking problems of racism in Mississippi with
problems of racism in the Congo and also the problem of racism in
South Vietnam. It's all racism .... And when these people in these dif-
ferent areas see that the problem is the same problem, and when 22
million black Americans see that our problem is the same as the prob-
lem of the people who are being oppressed in South Vietnam, and the
Congo and Latin America, then the oppressed people of the earth
make up the majority that can demand and not a minority that has to
beg.
quoting from MALIOLIM X: THE MAN AND HiS TIMES 257-58 (John Henrik Clarke ed.,
1969)).
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in the U.S. championed international human rights,Jim Crow laws,
lynchings, as well as formal segregation of schools, transportation,
and places of public accommodation continued unabated. ' The
reality for most African-Americans was, in fact, the antithesis of the
human rights principles being advanced abroad..2 1 Instead of join-
ing the growing human rights wave to keep pace with the evolving
standards of racial equality, the U.S. instead chose to distance itself
from the U.N. human- rights system.
The decision in Brown v. Board of Education' helped to assuage
the indignation in the growing human rights community. This de-
cision concluded that racial segregation and American constitu-
tional rights were inconsistent with each other and would be
reconciled through our own Constitution and domestic jurispru-
dence. 2 The domestic human rights advances during this time did
not represent a sudden ideological shift in the country, but rather
reflected the relentless agitation of civil rights activists.3 3 Similarly,
throughout the international human rights movement, there have
been numerous forces in North America that have strongly advo-
cated for the ratification of, and compliance with, the range of
human rights conventions supported by the U.N. "4
28 NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HIS-
TORY OF OPPOSITION, at 14 (1990) (quoting from Robert Cushman's N.Y. Times arti-
cle, Our Civil Rights Become a World Issue, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1948, at 12).
Now that the war is over, this nation finds itself the most powerful
spokesman for the democratic way of life, as opposed to the principles
of a totalitarian state. It is unpleasant to have the Russians publicize our
continued lynchings, our Jim Crow statutes and customs, our anti-Se-
mitic discriminations, and our witch hunts; but is it undeserved? We
cannot deny the truth of the charges; we are becoming aware that we do
not practice the civil liberty we preach.
29 See McDougall, supra note 26, at 575; see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 93-98 (1988).
30 Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States; An Internation-
alized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 15, 17 (1996).
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32 See Dudziak, supra note 29, at 118 (Brown laundered the principles of democracy
in the eyes of the world. After Brown, the State Department could blame racism on
the Klan and the crazies. They could argue that the American Constitution provided
for effective social change); see also the progeny of desegregation decisions preceding
Brown such as Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); and Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (referred to collectively by Dudziak, as fuirther proof to the inter-
national community of U.S. rejection of segregation and racial inequality).
3 VIRGINIA PRATT, THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY ON AMERICAN PAR-
TICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1986).
34 See Mayer, supra note 5. Among these advocates have been politicians, lawyers
and law professors, religious and civil rights leaders, non-governmental organizations,
[Vol. 4:59
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On the other hand, vociferous domestic opposition has
plagued the international human-rights movement from its very in-
ception. To understand why, it is useful to remember the anti-
communist and ultra-patriotic sentiments that dominated North-
American discourse following World War II. For example, Frank
Holman, a former president of the American Bar Association
(ABA), persuaded many Americans, including some in the U.S.
Senate, to garner severe skepticism and fear of the emerging inter-
national human-rights movement by characterizing it as a "Com-
munist plot to destroy the American way of life. ''3 5  Shortly after
this, Senator John Bricker emerged as an anti-human rights fa-
natic, declaring the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "an at-
tempt to repeal the Bill of Rights."3" Aiming to undermine U.S.
support for and involvement with human rights treaties, Senator
Bricker proposed an actual constitutional amendment to "protect the
sacred rights enjoy[ed] under the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution."3 7
The Bricker Amendment stated that "[a] treaty shall become
effective in the United States only through domestic legislation
which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."38 This clause
would have restricted the President's treaty making powers"9 and
further rendered all treaties non-self-executing, or unenforceable
without accompanying domestic legislation. As he fought for the
adoption of this amendment, Senator Bricker stated, "[m]y pur-
pose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-called Covenant on
Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public office will
ever dare to attempt its resurrection." ''
Although the Bricker Amendment never actually passed, it
certainly left its mark, as evidenced by the Senate's reaction to the
first human rights treaty "to cross their desks," the Genocide Con-
non-profit organizations, and other activists. For example, see McDougall, supra note 26,
at 572 (noting that W.E.B. DuBois, Walter White, Mary McLeod Bethune, Mordecai
W. Johnson and other African-American leaders participated as "activist observers" at
the San Francisco Conference where the U.N. was founded). (Citing GERALD HORNE,
BACK AND RED: W.E.B. DuBoIs AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR,
1944-1963, 35-39 (1986)).
35 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 749.
36 See Kaufman, supra note 28, at 64.
37 Henkin, supra note 15, at 343 (the U.S. record of human rights treaty ratifica-
tion is marred by our consistent use of RUDs (reservations, understandings and decla-
rations), and must be repaired by making the U.S. review this policy and begin to
approach human rights treaties with more respect and humility).
38 Id.
39 See Thomas, supra note 30, at 19.
40 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 349.
2001]
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vention.4 ' Emanating from Nazi atrocities during World War II, its
primary mission was the internationalization of the crime of geno-
cide, a goal that could not have reasonably been controverted.
However, due to the Senator and his followers, the treaty became
one of the most controversial items on the legislative agenda.42 Re-
lying on contemporary fears of communism and world govern-
ment, and claiming that the treaty would lead to the abrogation of
states' rights and to federal interference in segregation and race-
related crimes in the South, opponents succeeded in labeling the
Genocide Convention as distinctly un-American. It was almost
forty years after President Truman sent the treaty to the Senate
that they finally gave their consent.4"
By failing to ratify many other human rights treaties, and by
incorporating self-defeating reservations into those we have rati-
fied, the United States has not abandoned Senator Bricker's vision.
Natalie Kaufman has conducted an outstanding survey of the his-
tory of U.S. anti-human rights rhetoric and tactics.44 She demon-
strates how the illusion that U.S. constitutional rights reign
superior has been exploited to dupe Americans into believing that
international human rights would be at best useless, and at worst, a
dangerous threat to our freedom and autonomy. Opponents of
human-fights treaty ratification have justified their position with a
wide array of arguments that such instruments would: diminish
fundamental American rights; violate states' rights; promote world
government; subject citizens to trial abroad; enhance Communist/
Socialist influence; infringe upon domestic jurisdiction; increase
international entanglements; and create self-executing obliga-
tions. 4 5 Many of these concerns still reflect contemporary U.S.
human rights policy and practice. Although we have evolved to a
certain extent, our ongoing behavior reflects a continuing strain of
the defensiveness and arrogance initially raised by Bricker and his
progeny.
III. UNITED STATES' CONSTITUTIONALISM: A SHIELD AGAINST
DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS
As one of the remaining "superpowers" following the fall of
the former Soviet Union in Europe, the U.S. currently enjoys un-
41 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted December 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951, 78 UNTS 277.
42 See generally Kaufman, supra note 28.
43 See Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 367.
44 See Kaufinan, supra note 28.
45 See Kaufman, supra note 28, at 2-3.
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paralleled political and economic power and an almost untoucha-
ble status around the world today. Economic prosperity,
technological innovations, and military power place the United
States at the peak of global eminence."' This eminence does not,
however, bleed over into the international human-rights context.
It would surprise many inside and outside the U.S. to learn that
our compliance with human rights norms lags far behind most
other developed nations. Evaluating the origin of the exalted U.S.
human-rights image helps to explain our behavior relative to
human rights treaties and bodies. Such discernment facilitates nar-
rowing the gap between the human-rights standards the United
States demands abroad, and what it tolerates at home.
The U.S. Constitution, composed in 1789, is the oldest consti-
tution in force in the world today. 7 At the time of its signing, it
represented a radiant model for the protection of individual rights
and liberties in the context of a representative democracy.4" The
fact that our Constitution has survived basically intact for more
than two centuries has led some to the conclusion that this must be
because it is the best one. " Indeed, it seems at times to be wor-
shipped almost as a religion unto itself. 50 This may be best illus-
trated by a description of the National Archives building where the
Constitution is stored:
The high-ceilinged, dimly-lit display chamber is reminiscent of
the interior of a Greek temple. . .. Americans from around the
Country come to gaze at the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
the Declaration of Independence. They stand silently in line,
often with young children in tow, awaiting their opportunity to
approach the display cases and feast their eyes on the faded
script of the original documents. . .. Further indication of how
the documents are treasured is the nightly procedure of sinking
46 Round Table Discussion on International Human Rights Standards in the United States:
The Case of Religion or Belief 12 EmoRV INT'i. L. RLv. 973, 997 (Abdullah An-Na'im ed.,
1998) (although the focus of the conference was on religious rights, larger issues such
as U.S. domestic implementation of international human rights norms were ex-
amined in depth.) (Statement of Morgan Cloud, expressing the view that because of
the combined effect of American isolation and post-Cold War realities, judges and
legislators are less likely to turn to and accept international norms now than at any
time since World War II).
47 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 729; see also CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996) (comparing adoption
dates of different nations' Constitutions); Glendon, supra note 7, at 20. (In the after-
math of World War II, many nations found it necessary to rewrite or formulate their
Constitutions).
48 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 742.
49 See generally Henkin, supra note 4.
50) Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984).
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the display cases underground into reinforced vaults so that the
documents can survive even if the surrounding city of Washing-
ton is obliterated by a nuclear attack."5'
The national pride and veneration inspired by the U.S. Constitu-
tion suggest its status as more of a "holy relic than a secular docu-
ment laying out a scheme of national government."52
Moreover, this vanity has produced a dangerous streak of
"constitutional exceptionalism." In one remark reflecting this
streak, it was exclaimed that the U.S. has "more than two hundred
years of constitutional culture in this country and, by God, we are
not going to allow some foreigner or some arid international docu-
ment to tell us what we know best.15 ' Also, the U.S. maintains a
tendency to place our system of rights on a pedestal, beyond the
reach of domestic and international criticism. SenatorJesse Helms
best exemplifies this practice in his statement that, "[w] e would put
the international community on notice that we regard our system
as a superior protection of human rights than [sic] any other sys-
tem in the world."5 4 These examples of self-righteousness have
served only to obfuscate intelligent discourse about human rights
in the U.S.
In guarding its citizens' rights and liberties, the Constitution
often serves to deflect the adoption and implementation of bolder
human rights protections afforded under international law.55 We
must look beyond the text and mystique of the document and real-
ize that, in addition to liberty and freedom, the Constitution has
been used to embrace such institutions as slavery, sexism and xeno-
phobia, and "could be construed as distinctly anti-human rights in
content. '"' As a result, U.S. citizens unknowingly live without some
of the basic guarantees of human rights enjoyed by people of many
other developed nations.
This lack of awareness may be because in the U.S., human
51 Mayer, supra note 5, at 742-3; see generally, Grey, supra note 50.
52 Id.
53 An-Na'im, supra note 46, at 982 (statement made by David Bederiman.)
54 Mayer, supra note 5, at 751.
55 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 768, n.211 (noting this phenomenon particularly in
regards to gender discrimination). (Though the U.S. prohibits gender discrimination
in a number federal and state statutes, it has yet to pass the Equal Rights Amend-
ment); Glendon, supra note 7, at 528. (Japan's constitution guarantees the right to
receive an education and the right to work); see also Lester, supra note 15, at 539.
56 Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights
Law, 3 HARv. HUM. RTS.J., 54 (1990). It should be remembered that the U.S. Consti-
tution was originally an instnment designed in part to protect the interests of Protes-
tant, white, male property owners against everyone else.
57 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 728.
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rights are discussed in the limited context of specific or general
blights in countries deemed less sophisticated than the U.S.
Human rights are pushed aside as someone else's problem, not to
be thought of as issues within our own revered borders. Americans
have been conditioned to discuss their own blights as "social ills,"
or under the various separate rubrics of homelessness, welfare,
health care, criminal justice, or immigration-as isolated domestic
problems, not as human-rights issues per se. The American media
rarely, if ever, characterizes any of these domestic problems as
human-rights issues. This attitude is widespread, and may be
found duplicated on an infinite number of television screens, news-
papers, church pulpits, courtrooms, and classrooms around the
country. Americans must begin to make these connections, hold-
ing the United States accountable for its own human-rights record.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND COURTS
Between explicit guarantees in the text of the Constitution
and judge-made law interpreting these provisions, one may logi-
cally conclude that the U.S. is in fact required to comply with inter-
national law. The Constitutional provisions dealing with human
rights are the original Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] grants Congress
the 'power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of'
the Fourteenth Amendment, including its broad protections
against the denial of due process and equal protection. 15 8 Also
known as the "enabling clause," this language is a positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its powers to de-
termine what laws are necessary to secure protections afforded to
U.S. citizens both domestically and internationally.5 9 If so desired,
this constitutional provision could serve as a valuable vehicle to im-
plement human rights legislation.' °
Further, the Supremacy Clause dictates that: "[A]l1 Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
58 Michael H. Posner & PeterJ. Shapiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of
1993, 42 DEPAUL L. RLv. 1209, 1220 (1993).
5q See id. at 1223.
60 The full scope of the 1 4 th Amendment as it relates to human rights and the
application of international law is far too broad a topic to be adequately covered in
this article. For an excellent introduction to the topic, see Gordon A. Christenson,
Using Human Rights Law to lnform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L
REV. 3 (1983).
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States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby. ... "" Traditionally, this provi-
sion's language is not called upon for the authority to make and
adhere to international human rights treaties. However, the terms
"all Treaties made .... under the authority of the United States"
could be interpreted as providing a broad power to do so.
Additionally, the Offenses Clause of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that Congress has the power to "define and punish.. .offenses
against the Law of Nations. '162 By preventing individual states from
violating international law, this provision empowers the federal
government to present a unified voice on that front. The clause
was primarily enacted to protect our reputation among other na-
tions, a purpose that remains compelling. Unfortunately, this Con-
stitutional provision has been underutilized. To date, there has
never been a statute questioned, much less struck down, as an inva-
lid exercise of the Offenses Clause power. In fact, the courts often
defer to Congress to define offenses against the Law of Nations."3
Hence, this is another avenue by which to pursue a human-rights
agenda based on the U.S. Constitution.
On the other hand, U.S. jurisprudence has produced a sizea-
ble body of judge-made law related to the consideration, interpre-
tation, and implementation of international human rights norms."4
Subject to changing political ideologies, the Supreme Court's atti-
tude towards international law has ranged from Justice Frank-
furter's venerable admiration15 to Justice Scalia's suspicious
disdain."
One of the earliest cases to comment on the interplay between
domestic and international law was The Charming Betsy, a maritime
61 U.S. CONST. art. Vrl, cl. 2.
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also Posner and Spiro, supra note 61, at 1223.
63 Id. at 1225; see also id. at n.75 (listing a number of statutes enacted pursuant to
the Offenses Clause, including the Alien Tort Claims Act.)
64 Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Hunman Right Precepts in L.S. Histarq
and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989)
(The Supreme Court has generally hedged away from upholding international
human rights treat)' obligations, but has repeatedly recognized that human rights
norms and instruments can be useful in providing additional authority in interpreting
constitutional and statutory rights).
65 Kimberly Satterwhite, Defender or Offender: America's Role in the Protection of Interna-
tional Human Rights?, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 175, 177 (1994) (citing Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., Concurring).
66 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (Scalia, noting that execution
of juveniles is not contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society" that had been laid out and accepted since Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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case from 1804.67 This case established the principle that when-
ever possible, domestic law should be interpreted so as to require
the U.S. to fulfill its international obligations." Over a century
later, the supremacy of the Law of Nations was revisited when the
Supreme Court held, in Asakura v. Seattle, that "[t] reaties are to be
construed in a broad and liberal spirit and when two constructions
are possible, one restrictive of rights which may be claimed under
it, and the other favorable to them, the latter is preferred."" Fur-
thermore, in The Paquete Habana, this "liberal spirit" of construc-
tion was manifested when the court held in favor of the claimant
based on the "general consent of the civilized nations of the
world." '
Following this legal reasoning in The Paquete Habana, a new
and fairly novel approach to international human rights began in
1980 when the Alien Tort Claims Act7 was resurrected. The first
notable case using the Act was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, where the
court held that a citizen of Paraguay might be liable under the
Alien Tort Claims Act for torturing and killing a fellow Paraguayan
citizen.7 2 Here, the court granted jurisdiction to an alien of the
U.S. to sue a government official in his "mother" country. In its
decision, the court emphasized the increasingly significant role of
international law, and of human rights norms specifically, in U.S.
courts:
[Throughout the course of] the twentieth century, the in-
ternational community has come to recognize the common dan-
ger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human ights... In
the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize
that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual
and collective interest. . . Our holding today... is a small but
important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all
people from brutal violence.7 3
67 B zonkala v. Morrison, Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars
and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, page 2 (citing The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)).
68 The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 ("an act of Congress ought never be construed
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains").
9 Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
70 Cathleen E. Hull, "Enlightened by a HumaneJustice": An International Law Argument
Against theJuvenile Death Penalty, 47 U. KAN. L. Rjzv. 1079, 1098-99 (1999); see also The
Paquete Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
71 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (The Act, adopted in 1789, permits aliens to sue in U.S.
courts for torts committed in violation of the "Law of Nations" or of a U.S. treaty).
72 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
73 Id. at 890.
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Recently in Kadic v. Koradzic, the majority supported this analy-
sis and under the Act awarded over five billion dollars to survivors
of egregious human rights violations."4 Although the circuits are
split on how these cases should be interpreted, the "liberal spirit"
construction suggested in Asakura and by the Alien Tort Claims Act
allows U.S. courts to adjudicate an increasing number of cases in-
volving abuses of international human-rights law.7 5
Still, another source for advocates to rely upon exists in inter-
national law doctrine.7" In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,7 7 the appellant, a
Cuban detainee, sought relief through habeas corpus, claiming that
his detention violated international law. Specifically, the appellant
cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).7 Although the court
recognized the difficulty of using international agreements as valid
legal authority, it relied in part on these agreements and on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) "as
indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations."7"' In
granting habeas corpus, the court stated, "though the indeterminate
detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the U.S.
Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially remedial as a viola-
tion of international law." "8  The court's statement represents an-
74 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (ordering Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic to pay $745,000,000 and then another $4,500,000,000 in damages
to victims of rape, torture, and genocide).
75 Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1996) (awarding a judgement against the
torturer of three Ethiopian women); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (1994) (awarding
a $41 million dollar judgement to the human rights victims of a Hatian dictator);
Todd v. Panjaitan, 1994 WL 827111 (D. Mass., Oct 26, 1994) (awarding $14 million to
the mother of a young boy who was murdered by Indonesian troops in East Timor
during a massacre). In addition, two cases have been filed accusing oil companies of
human rights abuses against Nigerian citizens; Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe
was served papers last year while in the U.S. alleging human rights abuses stemming
from his country's elections; Former Chinese premier Li Peng was served on behalf of
Chinese students protesting China's actions during the Tiananmen Square protests in
1989. A group of women filed a class action against the Japanese government alleging
that they were sex slaves, or "comfort women," during World War II. See generallyJoyce
Wadler, Public Lives: Making Her Case Against Foreign Leaders, N.Y. TIMEs, September 29,
2000, at http://cannel.nytimes.com/2000/09/29/nyregon/29prof; Elizabeth
Amon, Alien Toi Claims Act Provides a Legal Forum for the World, THE NAT'L L. J., Oct.
19, 2000, on Law.com; Daphne Eviatar, A Victim's Bill of Rights, THE AMERICAN LAwYER,
Jan. 2, 2001, on Law.com; Mark Hamblett, Nigerian Rights Suit Against Shell OK'd by 2d
Circuit, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 2000, on Law.com.
76 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1099.
77 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
78 Id. at 795-97.
79 Id. at 797.
80 Id. at 798.
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other step in the evolution of U.S. jurisprudence that legitimizes
international law and norms in its consideration of human-rights
issues.
V. U.S. INSULATION FROM DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS - RUDs
There is a two-tiered system governing acceptance of and
membership to human-rights treaties. States express their support
for the principles of a treaty by signing the agreement, but they
only become domestically liable through ratification, which com-
municates a state's commitment to provide for, and protect those
rights within their own legal system. Each time the U.S. has
crossed the threshold to ratification, it has done so only with nu-
merous "reservations, understandings and declarations" (com-
monly referred to in the conglomerate as RUDs). 8" This practice
has enraged and inflamed even long-time allies of the United
States,8 who take their obligations under ratified treaties much
more seriously.83
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
reservation is a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modif3,
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State."84  States enter reservations that effectively mod-
ify or restrict the impact of the treaty. However, this right is a
limited one, subject to the conditions enumerated in Article 19 of
the Vienna Convention. A nation may not formulate a reservation
81 See generally David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42
DEPAUL L. RL~v. 1183 (1993).
82 Henkin, supra note 15, at 343; see also id. at n. 11, (At least 10 states have objected
to one or more of the RUDs attached by the United States to its ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Citing MULTILATERA. TREATIES DEPOSITED
WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1993, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.E/12, at 134-37.)
83 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 747 (contrasting the U.S. With other nations that "do
not treat international human rights as a force threatening the integrity of their con-
stitutions and domestic systems of rights. Instead, their constitutions may treat inter-
national human rights as a friendly entity and endorse them by express constitutional
provisions." Mayer goes on to describe provisions in the Spanish, Czech and German
Constitutions that explicitly incorporate international human rights as dictated in va-
rious treaties and covenants into their respective constitutions in a manner that is
binding) (citing CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORL.D, supra note 47).
84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at
art. 2 (1)(b).
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that is prohibited by the treaty, or one that is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty. 5 If it is determined that a reser-
vation is invalid under the rules set out above, there are two possi-
ble effects. First, the illegal reservation can be severed from the
treaty, rendering the state a full party."' Alternatively, if the reser-
vation cannot be severed, the state is not considered to be a party
at all.17 Thus, U.S. compliance to domestic human rights stan-
dards that fall short of those in ratified treaties serves to undermine
the overarching aim of the international human-rights
movement."8
Since the inception of the modern human-rights movement,
the U.S. has manifested a defensive and threatened stance towards
human-rights treaties. Though we feel compelled to sign and ratify
some of them, we are equally compelled to insulate ourselves
against their domestic application. The result is a qualified ratifica-
tion process that is "designed to ensure that these treaties would
have virtually no domestic legal effect in enhancing human
rights.""' Proponents of RUDs argue that the reservations serve an
important function in protecting our courts from a terrifying flood
of litigation. However, this contention has been addressed and de-
flected by Henkin." This fear is for the most part unfounded, as
most potential human rights cases that would be brought under a
human rights convention could already arise under the Constitu-
tion or civil rights laws, and those that do not should arise under
implementing legislation passed pursuant to our ratification of the
conventions.!' There are many explanations for these RUDs, some
of which point towards America's sense of international political
85 See id.
86 See generally William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Pa7y? 21 BROOKIuYNJ. INT'IL L. 277
(1995).
87 See Hull, supra note 73, at 1087.
88 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 343 (Henkin has expressed serious concern about
this practice of conditional ratification, noting that the purpose of human rights con-
ventions is to have countries assunme obligations to respect recognized rights in accor-
dance with international standards. Allowing states to enter reservations that signal
that the)' do not intend to comply with some of the provisions therein defeats the
entire purpose of setting universal norms).
89 Mayer, supra note 5, at 755; see also PAUL L. HOFFMAN & NADINE STROSSEN, EN-
FORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LA", IN THE UNITED STATES, IN HuNiAxN
RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 478 (1994); and Kaufman, supra note 28,
at 197 (the U.S. package of attachments to human rights covenants "makes a mock-
erv of the international human rights consensus.
90 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 346).
9. 1 See id.
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and legal superiority;9 '2 all of which serve to keep the United States
free from the grasp of international law.
As a whole, the range of RUDs that qualify U.S. ratification of
human-rights conventions suggest that "behind the invocations of
its Constitution, there lurks a banal preference for upholding do-
mestic laws and policies that afford weaker protections... than are
found in international law." '' As a result, the U.S. consistently rati-
fies human-rights treaties in this manner prompting countries to
doubt our good faith in the process.: "The Senate's practice of de
facto rewriting treaties, through reservations, declarations, under-
standings, and provisos, leaves the international credibility of the
U.S. shaken and its reliability as a treaty-negotiating partner with
foreign countries in doubt." 1 5 The U.S. contributes to undesirable
consequences both for itself and for the international community
when it places itself above the established ratification process.
Human-rights conventions exist to promote and demand re-
spect for human rights standards. Countries are encouraged to as-
sume mutual legal obligations to act in accordance with
international standards set forth in those conventions.9" This very
object is frustrated to the point of defeat when the U. S., through
RUDs, attempts to ensure that ratification of a convention will not
require any changes in U.S. law, policy or practice, even where we
9"2 See Henkin, id. at 341. Henkin provides a useful framework of five principles
that have informed U.S. RUDs:
1. The United States will not undertake any treat)' obligation that it will
not be able to carry out because it is inconsistent with the United States
Constitution.
2. The United States adherence to an international human rights treat)'
should not effect-or promise-change in existing U.S. law or practice.
3. The United States will not submit to the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice to decide disputes as to the interpretation or ap-
plication of human rights conventions.
4. Ever, human rights treat), to which the United States adheres should
be subject to a federalism clause so that the United States could leave
implementation of the convention largely to the states.
5. Every intenational human rights agreement should be non-self-
executing;
see also Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 367-8 (adopting and applying the same set of
principles to explain American resistance to international human rights treaties and
noris).
93- Mayer, supra note 5, at 820.
94 See Hull, supra note 72, at 13 (this might also be because eighty-five percent of
all multilateral treaties do not contain any reservations, thus further demonstrating
how the U.S. places itself above others in the human rights community); see also infra
notes 173 and 176.
95 Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 1173.
96 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 343.
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fall below internationally accepted standards. Indeed, if every state
subjected its ratification to the sort of reservations undertaken by
the U.S., the conventions would be rendered toothless and mean-
ingless. The U.S. seeks to sit in judgement on the human-rights
records of others, but vehemently refuses to be subjected to that
same scrutiny. At the very least, this suggests an intolerable level of
hypocrisy on the part of the U.S.; at worst it works to trivialize and
de-legitimize the international human-rights movement as a whole.
Nowhere is this dangerous hypocrisy clearer than in our continued
imposition of the death penalty on children.
VI. THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES-A
WORST-CASE SCENARIO
You may hang these boys; you may hang them by the neck
until the), are dead. But in doing it you will turn your face to-
ward the past. In doing it you are making it harder for every
other boy who, in ignorance and darkness, must grope his way
through the mazes which only childhood knows ... You may
save them and make it easier for every child that sometime may
stand where these boys stand. You will make it easier for every
human being with an aspiration and a vision and a hope and a
fate.9 7
- Clarence Darrow
The most glaring illustration of the contradiction between the
perception of the United States as a human-rights beacon and the
reality of the human rights record of the U.S. is our imposition of
the death penalty against children. 8 According to the acclaimed
death penalty expert Steven Bright, the United States holds the
auspicious title of being the world leader in the execution of juve-
nile offenders. 9  The list of countries that have either formally
abolished this practice or refused to implement it for a substantial
97 Lisa Kline Arnett, Death at an Early Age: International Law Aiguments Against the
Death Penalty forJuveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. RLV. 245 (1988) (citing ATTORNEY FOR THE
DAMNED 86 (A. Weinberg ed., 1957) (excerpt from Clarence Darrow's closing argu-
ment in Loeb-Leopold murder trial)).
98 See Geer, supra note 11, at 92. A full survey or analysis of the already prolific
literature regarding the juvenile death penalty is beyond the scope and purpose of
this paper. For further reading see Victor Streib,JuvENLEJUSTIcE IN AMERICA (1978);
Julian S. Nicholls, Comment, Too Young to Die: International Law and the h~nposition of the
Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 617 (1991): MichaelJ.
Spillane, Comment, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutional and International
Law Objections, 60 UMKC L. REV,. 113 (1991); David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile
Offenders by the United States Violates International Human Rights Law, 3 Ai. U. V. Ir'i..
L. & POL'Y 339 (1988).
94 See Bright, supra note 20, at 2796-97.
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period of time is quite long.' ° The United States stands among
only a handful of human rights pests to cling to this practice. 10
This section will give an overview of the juvenile death penalty in
U.S. practice, outlining the relevant jurisprudence as it has devel-
oped, noting when international law and human rights standards
have been considered. Finally, the juvenile death penalty will be
examined and analyzed in light of U.S. treaty obligations and po-
tential obligations among existing international legal standards
and norms. This section will demonstrate how different U.S. prac-
tice is in relation to the international community and how impo-
tent that hypocrisy makes us as a human-rights leader.
Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government au-
thorize the use of the death penalty. Two of these states, Illinois
and Maryland, have imposed moratoriums on executions." 2 Sev-
enteen states currently permit the execution of sixteen-year-olds,
and another five states allow seventeen-year-olds to be put to
I) Kha Q. Nguyen, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital Punish-
ment of Juveniles in the United States, 28 Geo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON, 401, 423-24
(1995). As long as ten years ago, countries which had abolished the death penalty
entirely included: Australia, Austria, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland,
Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, The
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, San Marino, Solo-
mon Islands, Sweden, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican City State and Venezuela.
Quoting from AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS, THE DEATH PENALTY:
A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, 259 (1989). The countries that have eliminated the practice
of executing juveniles, either by law or by treaty are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, An-
guilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia,
Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czechoslova-
kia, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea
(Democratic People's Republic), Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Montserrat, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Para-
guay, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vin-
cent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Western Samoa, Yemen (People's Democratic Re-
public), Yugoslavia and Zambia. Quoting Amnesty INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE
KILLS at 264-65.
101 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1080; see also Bright et al., supra note 20, at 2797 (the
other countries who continue to permit the execution of juveniles are Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria) (citing Amnesty Int'l USA, The USA to Con-
firm its Position as World Leader in Killing Child Offenders (last modified Jan. 25, 1999)
(http://www.amnestynsa.org/news/1999/25101199.htm).
102 Deborah T. Fleischaker, Director, Death Penalty Mortorium Implementation
Project, American Bar Association, during an interview October 25, 2002.
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death.1"" Prior to Stanford v. Kentucky" 4 just over a decade ago,
five states authorized the death penalty for fourteen-year-olds, and
Mississippi set the minimum age at thirteen. 11 5 The number of ju-
venile offenders facing the death penalty has increased 142% be-
tween 1983 and 20 0 2 .") Over our two hundred year history as a
nation, we have executed approximately 350 children and have an-
other 83 currently on death row. 10 7 This is hardly a record to brag
about.
Laws regarding the juvenile death penalty have shifted back
and forth over time. The first of two seminal cases on the issue was
actually decided with great deference to the standards and senti-
ments of the international human-rights community. In 1988, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,108 the Supreme Court held that a fifteen-
year-old did not possess the requisite culpability to be eligible for
the death penalty and cited Eddings v. Oklahoma, where the Court
stated that "during the formative years of childhood and adoles-
cence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judge-
ment expected of adults."'0 9 Moreover, Thompson recognized that
the death penalty does not deter children, making its imposition
"nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering.. ,,"t( In this case, evidence of a broad spec-
trum of professional organizations' vehement opposition to the ju-
venile death penalty was introduced to the Court by such groups as
the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute. '
103 http://www,%.deathpenaltyinfo.org (States with a minimum age of sixteen: Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Wyo-
ming. States with a minimum age of seventeen: Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Texas).
104 Infra note 115.
105 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1108.
06 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org, supra note 103.
107 Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation
Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty? 32 U.S.F.L. Rev. 735, 736 (1998);
see also Victor L. Streib, <http://w-vw.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm>, June
30, 2002.
108 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988).
109 455 U.S.104, 115-16 (1982).
1 i0 Id. at 833 (quoting Coker v. Georgia 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
S1 1 Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty
forJuvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. Rtv. 1311, 1334-35 (1993). In addition to Amnesty
International, in Stanford v. Kentucky and other similar cases, a large number of au-
thoritative professional organizations gave powerful voice to the argument that the
death penalty is unethical and inappropriate for juvenile offenders. Briefs were filed
by the following organizations: International Human Rights Law Group, Child Wel-
fare League of America, The National Parent and Teachers Association, National
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Justice Stevens noted this impressive display of domestic opposition
to the juvenile death penalty. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion, referred to Trop v Dulles,'1 2 and recognizing that other
nations' practice was informative to the Court as to the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety." '1 " The Court realized that most nations had rejected the
death penalty altogether, or at the very least, rejected it with re-
spect to juveniles. They also recognized that it would serve neither
national nor international interests to set ourselves apart as the
only civilized nation who kills our children for their crimes. This
indication was the first by the Supreme Court that human-rights
standards might be treated as legitimate authority in the considera-
tion of contemporary domestic constitutional matters.
Unfortunately, this decision was overruled a year later when
the Court announced its current approach to the juvenile death
penalty in Stanford v. Kentucky." 4 The Stanford plurality rejected
the notion expressed in Thompson that the death penalty is dispro-
portionate because juveniles lack the requisite culpability. Flaunt-
ing international standards, the Court stated that though eighteen
is indeed an arbitrary age, most minors understand right from
wrong. This understanding between right and wrong was appar-
ently equated with fully developed adult moral culpability. It was
further held that the juvenile death penalty is in accordance with
common-law tradition 15 and is in no way contrary to "evolving
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Children's Defense Fund, National Association
of Social Workers, National Black Child Development Institute, National Network of
Runaway and Youth Services, National Youth Advocate Program, American Youth
Work Center, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American Or-
thopsychiatric Association, The American Baptist Churches, American Jewish Com-
mittee, American Jewish Congress, Christian Church Disciples of Christ, Mennonite
Central Committee, National Council of Churches, General Assembly of the Presbyte-
rian Church, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Union of American Hebrew
Congregations, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, United Meth-
odist Church General Board of Church and Society and the United States Catholic
Conference.
112 356 U.S. 861 (1958).
113 Id. at 861.
114 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
115 Id. at 374. Justice Scalia stated in the opinion, "[T] here is... no relevance to the
laws cited by petitioners in their amici which set 18 [sic] or more as the legal age for
engaging in various activities. .. It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be
mature enough to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in or-
der to be mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is pro-
foundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all civilized
standards." Id.
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standards of decency." " Notably, this Court did not draw upon or
defer to international human-rights standards as it did the previous
year in Thompson.
This newly articulated standard of decency has "evolved" in
such a manner to allow for the execution of people like Johnny
Garrett. 1 7 Seventeen years old when he raped and murdered an
elderly nun, Johnny had a history of mental illness and, according
to medical experts, was extremely mentally impaired, chronically
psychotic, and brain-damaged as a result of several severe head in-
juries suffered during his childhood."' "There was also evidence
that, as a child, Johnny was physically beaten, raped, and forced to
participate in homosexual pornographic films."' 19 Dwayne Allen
Wright had a similar story. 12 1 In spite of medical findings that he
had suffered from depression, psychotic episodes, had signs of
brain damage, and was borderline retarded, he was sentenced to
death in Virginia, in 1991, for a murder he committed at the age of
seventeen.
In exercising the death penalty against juvenile offenders,
much less against those whose mental capacity is questionable, the
U.S. stance is blatantly inconsistent with international human-
rights standards, and of international law.12 ' Unless the Court
would "posit that the decency and the dignity of Americans are
somehow lower than those of the rest of the world,"122 our current
practice in this area must be revisited immediately. Our own chil-
dren's rights and criminal justice advocates, along with our treaty
partners and peers in the international human-rights community,
must refuse to allow this situation to continue. There is no need to
oppose the practice on a moral or theoretical basis when there is
ample authority in binding international human rights instruments
116 Id. at 379 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101).
117 Nguyen, supra note 100, at n.26 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: DEATH PENALTY DEVELOPMENTS IN 1992, at 6; also citing Ex Parte Garret,
831 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Juvenile Offender Facing Execution in Virginia-a Step Backwards, Amnesty Interna-
tional- News Release (Oct. 9, 1998) at http;//wwvw.amnesty.org/news/1998/
25107698.ltm.
121 SeeAn-Na'im, supra note 47, at 1003 (a formal finding against the U.S. was made
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights forjuvenile executions in case
9647, discussed infra note 179).
122 See Nanda, supra note 111, at 1338 ("if U.S. law and practice truly aim at a stan-
dard of decency, the Court must certainly incorporate an acknowledgement that al-
most the entire world's standard of decency is far higher..."). Id. at 1339.
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and general international legal norms to force the U.S. to acknowl-
edge its record and begin to reshape it.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 21 is
among the most powerful and significant human-rights instru-
ments to which the U.S. is a ratified party. Among the specific
rights enumerated in the ICCPR are: freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion; the right of peaceful assembly; the fight to
vote; the right to privacy; freedom of movement, residence, and
emigration; freedom from slavery and forced labor; and the gen-
eral right to protection of life, including protection against the
death penalty. '24 To that effect, Article 6(5) of the ICCPR prohib-
its imposition of the death penalty "for crimes committed by per-
sons below eighteen years of age."' 25 However, the United States
agreed to ratify the Covenant only with the following reservation:
The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitu-
tional constrains [sic], to impose capital punishment on any per-
son (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted.., including
such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eigh-
teen years of age. 2 '6
This reservation, like many others, was consistent with a feder-
alism argument. Essentially, the U.S. argues that certain treaty pro-
visions like the one here may only be exercised by the federal
government to the extent that they have control over states in such
matters. Since each state in the U.S. has its own criminal law provi-
sions and powers, it is argued that dictating the minimum age for
executions would itself intrude upon state rights. This argument,
however, is weak when used to perpetuate a practice in half of our
states that has been ceased, rejected, and condemned by almost
every other country in the world.
It is unclear whether this reservation is even valid. As outlined
earlier, the Vienna Convention states that any party "may, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless... the reservation is incompatible with an object
and purpose of the treaty."'2 7 According to this standard, the U.S.
reservation to article 6(5) of the ICCPR is unacceptable, as it di-
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United
States Sept. 8, 1992) (hereinafter ICCPR).
124 Id.
125 Id. at art. 6(5).
126 Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of 31 De-
cember 1994, at 126, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13 (1995).
127 See Vienna Convention, supra note 85, at Sec. 2, art. 19.
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rectly undermines an essential purpose of the Covenant.' 2 Al-
though the U.S. has reserved for itself the light to execute minor
defendants, I would assert that its reservations are null and void, as
they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
This attitude is also reflected in our refusal to ratify two other
human rights instruments: the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Child Convention) and the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR).12 9 The Child Convention seeks to provide
specific guarantees to juveniles because "childhood is entitled to
special care and assistance."''I As of 1998, every U.N. member had
ratified the Child Convention aside from the U.S. and Somalia. 3 '
The primary reason for U.S. non-ratification of this convention is
Article 37(a), which provides that "[n]either capital punishment
nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be im-
posed for offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of
age." 132 A few months before signature of the Child Convention,
the U.N. Human Rights Committee took advantage of its preroga-
tive to invalidate and forbid any reservation concerning the execu-
tion of children. This embarrassing position results, once again, in
our self-identification as a human rights delinquent.
The same is true of our failure to ratify the ACHR, which states
that "[c]apital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of
age. . .. ,, The U.S. participated in the drafting of this Conven-
tion and signed it, but because of this provision the U.S will not
have it ratified. U.S. insistence on subjecting juvenile capital of-
fenders to the death penalty not only offends the principles of
these human rights treaties and covenants, it offends even more
fundamental international legal notions such as customary interna-
tional law and jus cogens.
Customary international law emanates from tradition and
128 See de la Vega, supra note 107, at 755 (citing Edward Sherman, The U.S. Death
Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the
Limitations of the Flexible System Governing TreatY Formation, 29 TEx. INT'L L.J. 69, 79
(1994)).
129 The Convention on the Rights of the Child. U.N. GAOR, 44 h Sess., Stpp. No.
49, at 166, U.N. Doc A/RES/44/25 (1989).
130 Id. Preamble, at 3.
131 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1092 (citing Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Third Ses-
sion of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 92 Am. J. Int'l L 112, 116 n.27
(1998)).
132 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 129, at 17.
133 American Convention on Human Rights: (Pact of San Jose), Nov. 22, 1969,
OASTS 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA Ser.L/V/II.23,doc.21, rev.6 (1979), 1144 U.N.T.S.
144 art. 4(5), at 146.
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practice, rather than from any body of legislation. "The fundamen-
tal idea behind the notion of custom as a source of international
law is that states in and by their international practice may implic-
itly consent to the creation and application of international legal
rules," unless they have persistently objected to a particular
norm.'3 4 In other words, if a nation wishes to participate in inter-
national trade, politics, or tourism, it automatically subjects itself to
customary law. Thus, in areas where the U.S. has not been a persis-
tent objector,13 5 customary law may be said to become supreme
federal law and will supersede all inconsistent state and local law.'
13
Among the practices that have been found to breach custom-
ary law are genocide, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, and systemic racism. 37 An internationally accepted practice
becomes customary law when it meets three elements: generality,
duration, and opiniojuris.13' First, generality requires that the prac-
tice be condemned by a geographically broad and extensive array
of nations. Although universal condemnation is not required,
there should be a consensus that the practice breaches some ele-
134 Hull, supra note 72, at 1093 (citing MARK W.JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 42 (2d ed. 1993)); see also Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Cus-
tomary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
PoL.'x 147, 150 (1996).
135 See Arnett, supra note 97, at n.113
A nation may exempt itself from being bound by a rule of customary
international law by establishing itself as a persistent objector if it nakes
an explicit objection to the coalescing norm and has maintained a con-
sistent opposition since the inception of the norm. The United States,
however, has not effectively done this in regard to the norm against
juvenile executions. For example, the United States voted for adoption
of the ICCPR in the General Assembly in 1966 without objecting to arti-
cle 6(5). Subsequently, President Carter signed the Covenant without
opposition to article 6(5). When he transmitted the Covenant to the
Senate, he did include a memorandum from the State Department pro-
posing a reservation on the question of capital punishment. This pro-
posed reservation, however, was never acted on by the Senate and came
12 years after the Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly. Thus,
the United States has not made a persistent objection to the norm since
its inception and does not qualify as a persistent objector.
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115, comment e, at 66, (1987); contrast Lillich, supra note 57, at 69-70; with Curtis A.
Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORD. L. REV. 371 (1997) (federal political branches in the U.S. may
authorize international human rights litigation if they wish, through, for example,
application of international customary law as federal law, but they have thus far re-
sisted to doing so, making such litigation without any legitimate legal basis).
17 See id. at § 702.
138 BuRNs H. WESTON et al., International Law and World Order 109-111 (3V ed.
1997) (quoting DAVID H. OT, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 13-
16 (1987)).
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ment of human dignity. 3 9 The juvenile death penalty meets the
generality requirement when all but five countries in the world
have adopted laws prohibiting the practice, signed treaties agree-
ing not to impose it, or desisted from enforcing it. The second
element is duration, or how long the particular practice has ex-
isted.'11 A custom may have evolved among civilized nations over
hundreds of years, such as a prohibition against racial violence, or
it may have developed quickly, such as the freedom to explore
outer space or the Internet. A state practice has ripened into a
customary norm when the rule is "both extensive and virtually uni-
form."'' Many developed nations have never endorsed capital
punishment of adults or children. Still more have never permitted
its application to children. The vitually world-wide policy of not
allowing children to be subject to the death penalty has endured
long enough to qualify as a customary norm.
Finally, a state practice becomes customary law when it fulfills
the psychological element of opiniojuris. "Opiniojuris is usually de-
fined as a conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is
required by international law."' 42 When most states implicitly rec-
ognize the existence of a certain rule, it is thus presumed that the
rule exists. Opinio juris is satisfied in this case because only a small
number of states still maintain a practice of imposing the juvenile
death penalty. Thus, our continuation of this practice offends cus-
tomary law on all levels.
On the other hand, even if there were no such obligation we
would still bound by the norms of jus cogens. "3 Jus cogens, otherwise
known as peremptory norms, is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as "a norm accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character."'" Very few practices are authorita-
tively concluded to meet the threshold of jus cogens.145 "To be con-
139 Id.
14o See Hull, supra note 72, at 1095.
141 Id. at 1096.
142 Id.
14-3 See id. at 1096-1097.
144 See Vienna Convention, supra note 86, at art. 53. It has further been understood
as an "expression of the belief that, in the absence of a supranational entity governing
the international community, there must exist ethical and moral restraints on a state's
positivist powers to enter into agreements or engage in practices hostile to the public
order." See Nguyen, supra note 100, at 420.
145 Hull, supra note 72, at 1101 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
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sidered jus cogens, an international norm must meet three criteria:
1) a large number of states consider it necessary for international
public order; 2) multilateral agreements prohibit derogation from
the norm; and 3) international tribunals have applied the
norm."' 4" As previously discussed, all three of these requirements
have been met in regard to the juvenile death penalty. Almost all
states in the world have either overtly or implicitly refused to im-
pose the death penalty on children, because this practice violates a
number of multilateral human agreements including the ICCPR,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the American Con-
vention.1 7 Finally, as will be discussed in section VI of this paper,
the IACHR has already heard a case against the U.S. for imple-
menting this practice and found that it did violate regional norms
of jus cogens.14 As the U.S. is one of only five countries to continue
to execute juvenile offenders, and such a practice is morally and
legally condemned by most of the world, jus cogens seems to be sa-
tifactoily met. This makes the U.S. reservation to article 6 para-
graph 5 of the ICCPR void, and as such absolutely requires us to
abolish the practice nationally.
The United States' perpetuation of the death penalty, even
against juveniles, was not so anomalous fifty years ago. 4 ' Many
TIONS LAvv OF THE UNITED STATES §702 (1987)), lists six rules governing the character-
istics of jus cogens norms: A state violates international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones:
a) genocide
b) slavery or slave trade
c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals
d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment
e) prolonged arbitrary detention'
f) systematic racial discrimination
146 Id. at 1101 (citing Nguyen, supra note 101, at 443); see also de la Vega, supra note
107, at 761 (determining factors of a jus cogens norm also include the 'strength and
intention of the supporting states and the significance of the opposition.' While the
United States is considered a significant force in the international community, its
opposition alone cannot overcome the creation of a peremptory norm ... Just as
South Africa could not overcome the prohibition against apartheid, the U.S. should
not be able to overcome the prohibition against death penalty eligibility for
juveniles).
147 See De La Vega, supra note 107, at 760.
148 It should be noted that some found the IACHR finding unpersuasive as the
"regional" standard of jus cogens it recognized in its holding was a new concept, and
perhaps not yet acknowledged by the international human rights community as a
whole.
149 See Bright, supra note 20, at 2796-7 (citing Eric Procosch, Human Rights v. The
Death Penalty: Abolition and Restriction in Law and Practice, in Europe A Death-Penalty-
Free-Zone (unpublished)). Fifty years ago, only eight countries had formally abol-
ished the death penalty.
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countries at one time in their history have allowed the imposition
of capital punishment. However, it is both natural and appropriate
for domestic law and jurisprudence to evolve and mature over
time. To date, the U.S. has not kept pace with the maturation of
international law, which has been toward complete abolition of the
death penalty.15 1' That trend has played out consistently around
the world, except in the U.S., where more and more children are
being tried as adults, and executions of both minors and adults are
on the rise.' 5' Engaging in this backward and near-universally con-
demned practice, the U.S. has relegated itself to the bottom of the
human-rights heap. We need not, however, remain mired in this
grim international hypocrisy.'5  We have the means by which to
improve our human-rights record and reaffirm our commitment to
human rights.
VII. AVENUES OF RECOURSE
There is no need to accept this double standard or to remain
complacent in its ongoing practice. There are a variety of practical
and realistic means by which the U.S. might reconcile its domestic
laws with the international human rights norms it champions.
These avenues of recourse may be divided into several categories:
domestic legal remedies, international legal remedies, and reme-
dies pressed by U.S. and international civil society, the press, and
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). If international hu-
man rights law is to maintain credibility as an authoritative source
of power and pressure-and it must-it needs to be clear that its
delinquents will be reprimanded.
1. Domestic Legal Solutions
There are a number of constitutional, executive, judicial and
legislative prerogatives that could be taken to rectify U.S. contra-
vention of human rights. First, Article III of the U.S. Constitution
authorizes the judiciary to interpret and enforce international
treaty law.'15 1 "By using international law to inform or aid in the
150 See Geer, supra note 11, at 75.
151 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1080; see also Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death
Penalt~y: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26 Lo'. U. CM. L.J. 147, 160 (1995). Several
scholars have noted the increasing trend to try children as adults (thus maximizing
the possibility that the' will be subject to the death penalty) obscures more proactive
efforts to address the reasons why such juveniles commit such violent crimes and reha-
bilitate them before adulthood.
152 See Hull, supra note 72, at 1108.
153 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in
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interpretation of a constitutional right, the right attains greater
credence as one that has universal recognition."' 154 Curiously, this
power to enforce international standards domestically has been left
untapped. The framers of our Constitution intended for interna-
tional law to play an active role in domestic law. Therefore, ignor-
ing this source would defeat the intent considered vital to
authentic constitutional interpretation. "To disregard the interna-
tional perspective when deciding issues of human rights law is to
ignore a vital source of law."'15 5
The Constitution offers other potential avenues through
which to pursue domestic human rights. As discussed earlier, the
Offenses Clause of the U.S. Constitution 56 provides Congress an-
other means by which to enact the necessary legislation that would
bring parity between international norms and current U.S. stan-
dards of human rights. The Supremacy Clause offers an additional
viable constitutional venue for the pursuit of domestic human
rights.' 57 Also, the Supreme Court has recognized an un-enumer-
ated "foreign affairs" power entrusted to Congress, whose bounds
have yet to be explored.15 Furthermore, the U.S. Constitution has
often been interpreted according to evolving social and political
realities. Once used to justify slavery, it was then used to abolish it.
The various constitutional provisions discussed here provide a di-
verse and exciting array of human-rights enforcement options
whose limits have yet to be stretched.
Our second source of positive domestic authority to promote
and defend human rights is the President. U.S. presidents have
taken varied interests and roles as proponents and opponents of
the human- rights movement.1'5 9 President Carter, for example,
signed all five major human rights covenants during his Adminis-
tration and sent them to the Senate for ratification. 60 President
Reagan, on the other hand, avoided any human rights involvement
law and equity, arising tinder this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made tinder their authorit3,. . .." This implies that the
U.S. judiciary is entitled to draw upon treaty law to which the U.S. is a party in deter-
mining related domestic issues.
154 Sattenvhite, supra note 67, at 189 (quoting Lisa K. Arnett, Comment, Death at an
Early Age: International Law Argument Against the Death Penalty forjuveniles, 57 U. CIN. L.
R.V. 245, 261 (1988)).
'55 Id. at 190.
156 See U.S. CONST., supra note 64.
157 See U.S. CONST., supra note 64.
158 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Perez v.
Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
151) See Mayer, supra note 5, at 753-54.
160 See Lillich, supra note 56, at 68.
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during his tenure, and some say, expressed "benign neglect" and
even outright hostility towards any domestic application of interna-
tional human rights. 6' President Bush, other than broadcasting to
the world the egregious human rights violations perpetuated by
Sadaam Hussein in Iraq during the Gulf War crisis, did almost
nothing to further domestic participation in the international
human-rights framework.
President Clinton presented himself as a strong human rights
advocate in the 1990s, and made some superficial efforts to follow
through with action. In 1998, for example, President Clinton is-
sued Executive Order 13107 entitled, "Implementation of Human
Rights Treaties. "162 This order made bold claims and commit-
ments, but is more impressive on paper than in practice.'63
Though the Executive Order used strong language in support of
international human rights and announced responsible initiatives
to hold the U.S. accountable for its actions, the Order failed to
lend any feasible legal mechanism to alter our human rights status
quo.
Clinton should also be noted for his recent signing of the In-
ternational Criminal Court statute (ICC). Although the U.S. was
among the loudest and most emphatic objectors during its negotia-
161 Id. at 54.
162 Executive Order 13107 - Implementation of Human Rights Treatise, 34 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2549 (Dec. 14, 1998).
163 Section 1 reaffirms a commitment to the protection and promotion of human
rights and to respecting and implementing our obligations under the treaties to
which we are a party. It further asserts that it is the policy and practice of the U.S. to
promote respect for international human rights in our relationship with other coun-
tries and by working to strengthen bodies such as the U.N. . Sections 2-4 establishes
the responsibilities of U.S. executive departments and agencies to fulfill their respec-
tive obligations to facilitate U.S. compliance with international human rights norms.
These sections also establish an "Interagency Working Group on Human Rights Trea-
ties" to provide guidance and oversight regarding U.S. adherence to human rights
obligations. Subsection vii of section 4 states that the working group will conduct an
"...annual review of United States reservations, declarations, and tnderstandings to
human-rights treaties, and as to matter as to which there have been nontrivial com-
plaints or allegations of inconsistency with or breach of international human rights
obligations, in order to determine whether there should be consideration of any mod-
ification of relevant reservations, declarations, and understandings to human rights
treaties, or United States practices or laws ..." This is followed, however, by an
insulatory provision. Section 6 states that "nothing in this order shall create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United
States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
This order does not supercede Federal statutes and does not impose any justiciable
obligations on the executive branch." This section renders the rest of the proclama-
tion mere theory, much in the same way that the Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations made by the U.S. renders its treaty ratification toothless and superficial.
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tion, we gave in and signed on New Year's Day, 2001. However, our
embarrassing resistance to the ICC once again revealed our human
rights double standard, as our primary objections to it rested on a
deep concern that U.S. troops and other federal officials might ac-
tually be subjected to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Convinced that
we could utilize an RUD consequence to escape that consequence,
or find some other means to place ourselves beyond its jurisdic-
tion, we conceded to sign it with the knowledge that the Senate
must still ratify it. While Clinton demonstrated the potential of the
Presidential office in respect to human rights, it appears highly un-
likely that our newly elected President George W. Bush will be a
champion of human rights in the U.S.
Our third source of positive domestic authority is the courts.
They can serve as instruments of enforcement of international le-
gal obligations as well as work as respectful proponents of interna-
tional human-rights norms. "' Courts possess the constitutional
authority, the precedent and the moral responsibility to do so.
Separation of power principles and judicial review should prevent
us from being condemned to ratifying treaties on paper and ignor-
ing them in practice. 115
We are unique in having an independentjudiciary that has the
power to strike down acts of Congress and acts of state legislatures
and a long tradition of actively doing so. The American position is
that, "if these fuzzy ideals are written into law, they will be actually
enforced. . . [S]eparation of powers and judicial review in the
United States mean that we do not have the option that a lot of
countries have of ratifying treaties on paper and ignoring them in
practice. I assume Iraq has ratified a lot of international treaties,
but there are no independent enforcement mechanisms in that
country that would make ratification meaningful." 6"
This is as it should be, for what purpose is served by ratifying a
treaty that had no chance of being enforced? Our courts have
demonstrated, albeit sporadically, that they are willing to consider
international law in their decisions. U.S. jurisprudence should re-
visit the guiding rationale of Weems v. United States," 7 which held
164 See Paust, supra note 66, at 596-611 (concluding that although domestic courts
have historically refused to view human rights treaty obligations as binding and justici-
able in domestic courts, the Supreme Court has recognized that human rights norms
may provide legitimate and helpful insights in interpreting domestic constitutional
and statutory law).
165 See An-Na'im, supra note 46, at 992-3.
166 Id. (statement by Douglass Laycock).
167 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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that the death penalty "is not fastened to the obsolete but may ac-
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu-
mane justice."6" Some members of the current Supreme Court
support the notion of pursuing this enlightenment by considering
the views of the international human rights community.' "' Hence,
human rights advocates should encourage this enlightenment at
home and abroad.
As evidenced by a recent string of cases decided under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, international human rights do seem to be
taking a more prominent role in U.S. courts. 17" Some U.S. courts
have demonstrated that they offer a hospitable forum for the pros-
ecution of international human rights violations by foreign plain-
tiffs against foreign state actors. 171 In doing so, they have also
showed a willingness to entertain human rights claims made by
American citizens for violations committed by foreign actors. 172 To
this point, however, there is no viable domestic forum for hearing
human-rights claims that implicate the U.S. government or state
actors.'73 The establishment of this forum will be the final frontier
of the U.S. human-rights evolution, and will allow the U.S. to begin
to harmonize its human rights preachings with its practice to
harmonize.
Our fourth source of positive domestic authority is Congress.
The legislature has considerable power and responsibility to do
their part in holding the U.S. legally accountable for our human-
rights issues. Members of Congress must find the courage and dig-
nity to restore our status as a credible leader in the human-rights
community, while raising our laws up to par with those of the inter-
national community. As Henkin writes, "[o]ur trumpet in the
cause of human rights has... been muffled by our continued fail-
ure to ratify the principal international human rights covenants
168 Id. at 378.
169 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (the pluralit, opinion, written
bvJustice Stevens as well as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, expressed a will-
ingness to consider the international human rights perspective in determining the
scope of cruel and unusual ptnishment. Concededly, Justices Scalia and White dis-
agreed most vehemently with this approach in their dissent).
170 See generally, 28 U.S.C. §1350, supra note 73.
171 Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Approach, 3
BUFF. JOUR. INT'L L. 261 (1996-97).
172 Id.
173 Id. (American courts have purposely excluded themselves from an entire class of
human rights cases alleging death, destruction and suffering at the hands of the U.S.
government and its agents. To ease their doubts (or consciences), our courts claim
that they would otherwise be interfering with both U.S. foreign policy and the separa-
tion of powers doctrine).
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and conventions." 74
Congress must embark upon two crucial processes forthwith.
First, they must eliminate all RUDs to ratified covenants that insu-
late the U.S. from domestic implementation of the rights secured
by the treaties. The reactionary and isolationist attitude espoused
by Senator Bricker and others in the 1950s must be purged from
the Senate and from our legislation. Second, Congress must enact
legislation that grants domestic force to the rights guaranteed by
the conventions ratified by the U.S.1 75 Individuals must be able to
file suit in U.S. courts for violations of rights protected under
human-rights covenants. In doing this, the U.S. would earn both
the credibility and integrity it already claims to have in the estima-
tion of its international peers. 1
76
2. The United States as Defendant: Formal Complaints and
Actions against the United States
The United States need to take advantage of such interna-
tional adjudicatory bodies as the International Court of Justice and
the Inter-American Commission as a means of hearing cases
against the U.S. . The International Court ofJustice (ICJ), a body
created by the U.N. Charter and designed to be the principal judi-
cial arm of the U.N., presents another avenue of enforcement for
international human rights in the U.S. . Article 38 of the Statute of
the ICJ recognizes both international agreements and custom as
primary sources of international law. Thus, the ICJ could find vio-
lations of any human rights that are contained in agreements
which the U.S. has ratified or which have the force of international
customary law. 177
In the past, the U.S. has demonstrated indifference when criti-
174 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 384 (citing the Convention on the elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted December 18, 1979, entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981, BA Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 46), UN Doc. A/
34/46, (1979); and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Januan' 3, 1976, G. .A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3.
175 See Henkin, supra note 15, at 395. This does not mean that we must constitution-
alize any new rights, but rather enable those we have already formally recognized to
be made available to U.S. citizens.
176 See Dudziak, supra note 29, at 62 (noting that the U.S. credibility in foreign
policy matters with numerous countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was tar-
nished in the early stages of the international human rights movement by the contra-
dictions between American political ideology and practice). Just as this contradiction
posed a threat to U.S. credibility in the international human rights community then,
we must reassess it now and work toward its radication.
177 See generally Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights,
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cized by the ICJ.' 7 8 International pressure, the media, and greater
public recognition of the power of this body could give their deci-
sions some muscle. Admittedly, the ICJ is viewed by the interna-
tional community as mired in bureaucracy and overly dependent
on the initiative of member nations to self-enforce and, as such, it
is not the most powerful means of liability for human-rights viola-
tions. It does, however, present a valid and underutilized avenue
for increased accountability.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAC), is
yet another possible forum for the adjudication of human-rights
violations in the United States. The IAC conducts studies on state
compliance with human rights goals based on which they make
recommendations to the member states. 79 The IAC serves to pro-
cess individual complaints concerning violations, to prepare coun-
try reports on violations, and to propose remedial measures
regarding human rights violations. Ultimately, the IAC provides
individuals with a forum where they can bring human rights com-
plaints against the U.S.. Under the American Declaration, the IAC
can find violations of certain protected human rights and issue a
resolution condemning such practices. Of particular interest, in
1987, the IAC condemned the U.S. because of its continued imple-
mentation of the death penalty against juveniles. 8
Like the United Nations' ICJ, however, the JAC's findings have
only a nominal impact on the U.S. because it offers no effective
mechanism for enforcement. "The effectiveness of such a perma-
nent body depends upon the international community's agree-
Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and
Welfare "Reform", 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 596 (1998).
178 This is so primarily due to the non-self-executing provisions the United States
uniformly attaches to its ratification of human rights instnments. This practically
means that we have not submitted to any other court's jurisdiction.
179 WILLIAM R. SILOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LA.W 511
(2d ed. 1995).
180 Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987);
reprinted in INTER-AMERIGAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 260 (1987). The case in-
volved two seventeen year olds who committed murder and were sentenced to death,
one in Texas and one in South Carolina. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review
either sentence, and both boys were executed in 1986. Petitioners claimed that the
U.S. violated the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as
customary international law in carrying out these sentences. The IACHR held that
the prohibition of the death penalty had reached the status of a regional jus cogens,
though the rule had not ripened yet into a customary norm. The Commission
avoided a finding on the issue of whether these executions ware unacceptable per se,
because an appropriate age to delineate adulthood was not yet established. However,
the U.S. was condemned for this practice using an equal protection framework, under
the reasoning that the inconsistent determination of a uniform age of "adulthood."
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ment and commitment to a reconstruction and re-concep-
tualization of sovereignty as a principle that holds human rights as
sacrosanct and behind which violators will not be offered um-
brage."181 The international community itself must focus on the
creation of effective mechanisms, both domestic and global, that
will prohibit States from hindering the promotion of international
human rights.
Various U.N. Commissions and procedures also exist to evalu-
ate state compliance with international human rights covenants.
Where violations are found to have occurred, they have issued rep-
rimands. The U.N. may, for example, send an envoy or rapporteur
to study a particular violation or appoint an ad hoc committee to
conduct an investigation into an alleged violation. Though these
processes are painfully slow, and sometimes vulnerable to political
influence, they can be quite effective. For instance, in 1998, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and
Arbitrary Executions issued a report about the death penalty in the
U.S., specifically condemning the continued execution of chil-
dren. 182 This biting report is now available as a resource to human-
rights activists and scholars around the world.
Less formal criticism at the U.N. may also be an effective
means of pressuring countries to increase human-rights protec-
tions. German human rights expert Eckart Klein made a particu-
larly harsh critique of the U.S. in view of its obligations under the
ICCPR:
The United States representatives had consistently focused on
the United States Constitution in their answers to the Commit-
tee, reflecting their Government's view that the Constitution al-
ready met all its obligations under the Covenant, with allowance
made for the reservations. The United States was right to be
proud of its Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, but it was
not the only decisive norm...
The signing of human rights treaties must represent the Govern-
ment's recognition of its duty to guide its people and strive for
change wherever needed. The world needed the United States
to lead the way in the promotion and protection of human
181 Hernandez, supra note 176, at 614.
182 See Bright et al., supra note 20, at 2799 (citing Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68* (1997)); see also
de la Vega, supra note 107, at 768 (the Rapporteur recommended, among other
things, that the U.S. cease its imposition of the death penalty on persons under eigh-
teen, lift its reservations to the ICCPR, particularly to article 6, and ratify the Conven-
tion of the Rights of the Child).
2001]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
rights, and it would do so best by fully accepting international
standards and its own international human rights
responsibilities. 1-3
Such public admonitions in the U.N. are no doubt embarrassing
for the U.S., and they communicate an important message: one's
leadership and influence is only as good as one's record.
The U.N. mandates member countries to issue periodic re-
ports on their domestic progress and compliance with interna-
tional human-rights instruments to which they are full parties. The
U.S. has traditionally resisted such reporting requirements, but did
issue its first report in 1994. Reflecting upon its compliance with
the ICCPR, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor admitted: "while the state of human rights pro-
tection in the United States has advanced significantly over the
years, many challenges and problems remain." I"4 Acknowledging
to our international critics that we have an imperfect human-rights
record was an important first step in rectifying our conduct. The
next step is to take take action to remedy our most egregious viola-
tions, such as continued implementation of the juvenile death
penalty.
3. Civil Society's Role in "Outing" the United States.
Finally, we must capitalize on the power of domestic rights
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international
human fights groups, and the media to call attention to our
human rights double standard, organize against it, and apply pres-
sure to encourage compliance with international norms. Enforce-
ment of human rights relies to a great extent on the voluntary
compliance of states that fear the exercise of moral or political
force by other states. Unfortunately, the United States is known for
"flagrantly ignoring international pronouncements as to its express
breaches of norms .... Thus, voluntary compliance is not a comfort-
able source upon which to rely to urge the United States to remedy
[its domestic] human rights violations."' However, jointly, do-
183 Maver, supra note 5, at 822-23 (quoting U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53('
Sess., 1406h mtg. at 7-8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1406 (1995)).
184 John Shattuck, Civil and Political Rights in the United States, Statement intro-
ducing the first report addressing the U.S. compliance with the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, in 9/19/94 U.S. Department of State Dispatch 628.
185 Hernandez, supra note 177, at 589: referring to Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26);John H. Jackson,
Helins-Burton, the U.S. and the W T.O., ASIL Insight (Mar. 1997) (internet document on
file with the author).
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mestic and international civil society may wield enough power and
influence so that we need not rely on U.S. voluntary compliance
with international human-rights norms.
The court of public opinion is at times more powerful and
effective than any court of law. It would be interesting to survey
American citizens and determine how many are aware that we are
among a small minority of developed nations to implement the
death penalty on such a grand scale and almost alone in enforcing
it upon children. I would venture to guess that most would be sur-
prised by this information. The international community is much
more aware of this anomaly, I believe, and has openly criticized
and condemned the practice.1" 6 One Italian citizen commented in
a letter to the Philadelphia Inquirer:
We cannot comprehend how people of a democratic, free,
and independent nation-who have fought and continue to
fight with courage and self-denial for the democracy, freedom,
and independence of other people; who after the atrocities of
World War II and Nazi concentration camps had the strength to
forgive their enemies, will not grant one of its children a chance
to make amends.
18 7
U.S. civil society must begin to take a more active role in bring-
ing this double standard to the public's attention and applying
pressure to rectify it. This tactic proved effective before, as shown
by the Civil Rights movement's ability to "exploit international po-
litical relations and rivalries in order to pressure the U.S. to get its
own house in order."' 88 This strategy could be replicated in other
human-rights contexts, especially with the juvenile death penalty.
The power of shame and guilt should not be underestimated. 8 It
186 See Bright, supra note 3, at 2797 (citing Richard Boudreaux, To Italy, A U.S. Con-
vict Symbolized the Crime of Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997 at All) (Ste-
phen Bright notes that various nations, such as, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa
are among those to wonder and point the finger at the U.S. for persisting to imple-
ment a practice that has been abandoned by their countries and by most Western
democracies).
187 Hull, supra note 73, at 1079 (citing Strater, infra note 150, at 169 and (quoting
Amy Linn, Should We Kill Our Children? The Death Penalty Debate, PHIIADELPHIA IN-
QUIR ER, Oct. 4, 1987, at 12 which quotes a letter from and Italian National to Gover-
nor Orr of Indiana)).
188 Thomas, supra note 30, at 17. It has also, for example, proven effective abroad in
the women's rights movement to combat rape in Pakistan. See id. at 23 (citing Hina
Jilani, Diversity in Character and Role of Hunan Rights NGO's, in Claiming Our Place 108-
14 (Margaret A. Schuler, ed., 1993). (This movement cast the rape prevalent there
not only as a criminal act under domestic law, but also as a human rights violation.
This internationalized strategy not only advanced domestic legal reforms, but also
influenced how the international community viewed the issue).
189 See de la Vega, supra note 107, at 770.
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is time to raise our voices, at home and abroad.
In addition, substantive public sanctions by other nations, pos-
sibly even economic sanctions, must be leveled against the U.S..
Such punishment will capture international attention and levy sig-
nificant economic repercussions for non-compliance. We have uti-
lized this strategy for decades against a panoply of nations
including South Africa, Iran, and Iraq, Libya, Haiti, Burma, and
Nicaragua. 9 " We are not above the same sort of scrutiny and ad-
monition. The implementation of this strategy would be compli-
cated. The U.S. presently enjoys unparalleled economic and
military power in the world and would not suffer as much from
these sanctions as would less prosperous nations. 9' Moreover,
many nations fear leveling such sanctions against the U.S., because
of the potential loss of much-needed foreign aid that they receive
from us. However, even if sanctions and reprimands from less pow-
erful nations had an effect like minnows nipping at the shark's fin,
they continue to hold a symbolic significance.
Finally, NGOs regularly publish studies and issue reports re-
garding a wide array of international human rights issues. Their
efforts serve to educate U.N. delegates on pertinent issues as well as
to inform the general public of political and social concerns
around the world, and to mobilize support around those issues. 192
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International
American Red Cross, and the Lawyers' Committee for Human
Rights regularly submit damaging reports against the U.S. to the
U.N., which pushes the U.S. to bring its domestic practices closer
in line with international human-rights standards. These NGOs
have generated a fair amount of press coverage and sparked pres-
sure on the U.S. to comply with international human-rights
standards.
The impact of such investigation and publicity could be even
more effective if it included an increased effort to introduce and
oversee concrete solutions to human rights problems.'93 NGOs
could further bolster their efforts by collaboration with domestic
190 Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YLE J.
INT'L L. 1, 41-43 (2001) (various national security statutes, such as the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000), and the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1988), give the President
broad power to impose trade restrictions for foreign policy reasons, which may, at the
President's discretion, include human rights concerns); see id. at 35.
191 See An-Na'im, supra note 46, at 997.
192 SeeJilani supra note 186; see also Thomas supra note 30, at 123-29.
193 See Posner, supra note 2, at 628.
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civil-rights groups who are more intimately involved with the
problems. Such collaboration is a tried and true method of exert-
ing the maximum degree of pressure in all the right places.'" 1 The
avenues of recourse available to confront the U.S and demand
change regarding its human rights double standard are numerous
and exciting. Though the task seems daunting, it will be accom-
plished if all the available avenues are diligently traversed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 1948, President Truman proclaimed to Congress: "If we
wish to inspire the peoples of the world. . .we must correct the
remaining imperfections in our [own] practice of democracy.' '19 5
Although the international human-rights landscape looks drasti-
cally different in the 21" century than it did then, his words still
ring true. This does not mean, however, that we have failed as a
member and leader of the human- rights movement. This move-
ment has grown, matured, and achieved a great deal since its in-
ception, as have most countries involved in the community. The
U.S. has evolved as well, but our arrogance and self-righteousness
prevents us from reaching the established norms.
Our human-rights responsibilities cannot be discharged by
dictating to others what standards they must comply with, or by
shielding our own culture and society from the influence and dic-
tates of more progressive nations.' 96 Concomitantly, this leader-
ship role cannot be fully realized by placing all energy on domestic
compliance with international norms while turning a blind eye to
the human-rights crises around the world. The two undertakings
must be carried out simultaneously, with genuine respect and
humility. Civil society and government institutions must each do
194 SeeThomas, supra note 30, at 123-25 ("[iun 1993, a joint effort between Human
Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union succeeded in issuing a joint
report on the U.S. failure to comply with certain provisions of the ICCPR. The report
led to a U.N. inquiry of the U.S. about ongoing issues of racism and sexism as well as
the treatment of juvenile offenders").
195 Harry Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents: Har' S. Truman, 1948, p. 126,
quoted in William C. Berman, IN THE POLITICS OF CMIL RIGHTS IN THE TRUMAN ADMIN-
ISTRATION 85 (1970).
196 See Mayer, supra note 5, at 759 ("[w]hen adherence to the Constitution is per-
fectly compatible with acceptance of the higher international norm, it is not [neces-
sary] to uphold constitutional supremacy that compels the United States to reject the
higher international norm. The invocation of the Constitution in such a situation is
simply a smoke screen to obscure the political decisions that prevent persons who
would benefit from the higher international norms from being able to enjoy en-
hanced rights").
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their part to achieve this by choosing their preferred avenue of
recourse to help us live up to the standards we claim to embrace.
The failure of the U.S. to participate in the shared framework
of the international human rights system weakens our credibility as
a legitimate force in the movement as a whole. International law is
powerful in its capacity to draw attention to human rights abuses
around the world, and to garner public opinion to pressure coun-
tries to change their ways. We must continue to search for the
bravest, most creative, and most effective solutions to human rights
dilemmas, both domestically and abroad. The general inefficacy of
the presently existing international human-rights constructs to pro-
scribe, prevent, or punish human rights violations should not be
construed as an indication of "weakness in the system or as a failure
of its aspirations."'9 7 The three avenues reviewed here represent a
smattering of approaches that may be taken in order to narrow the
gap between what the U.S. practices and preaches in its role as a
model of international human rights. The human-rights discipline
is very young and rapidly evolving. We must be patient but relent-
less in helping the U.S. domestic human-rights record catch up to
its ambitious agenda for the rest of the world.
AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT
Just prior to this article going to press, the Supreme Court was
once again faced with the constitutionality and human rights impli-
cations of the juvenile death penalty in In Re Keven Nigel Stanford,
537 U.S. - (2002) No. 10-10009, October 21, 2002. Although the
Court denied certiorari on the case by a slim majority, Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined in a seething dissenting
opinion which alluded to the embarassing double standard es-
poused by the U.S. in our continued implementation of the prac-
tice. Justice Stevens concluded the dissent by stating that,
"[O]ffenses committed by juveniles under the age of 18 do not
merit the death penalty. The practice of executing such offenders
is a relic of the past and is inconsistent with evolving standards of
decency in a civilized society. We should put an end to this shame-
ful practice."
In an interview conducted immediately after this case was con-
sidered, Deborah Fleischaker, director of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project,
indicated that the Supreme Court will likely be forced to consider
197 Hernandez, supra note 177, at 607.
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this issue yet again in the near future. She suggested that as popu-
lar opinion and international pressure continue to gravitate toward
ending the practice, Justice O'Connor may well become the fifth
justice required for the Court to put an end to the execution of
juveniles in the U.S. once and for all.

